College Choices: The Economics of Where to Go, When to Go, and How to Pay For It by Caroline Minter Hoxby
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the
National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: College Choices: The Economics of Where
to Go, When to Go, and How to Pay For It
Volume Author/Editor: Caroline M. Hoxby, editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-35535-7
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/hoxb04-1
Conference Date: August 13-15, 2002
Publication Date: September 2004
Title: Introduction to "College Choices: The Economics
of Where to Go, When to Go, and How to Pay For It"




It Is Not Just About Attending College Anymore
I, like the other authors of this book and, indeed, most Americans, was
brought up on the idea that attending college was a crucial decision. How
often did we hear someone say, “If only she had gone to college” or “It
would have made all the diﬀerence if he had enrolled in college” or “I
would have pursued a diﬀerent career if I had not gone to college”? Most
people believed in the transforming role of college attendance. Some
people even invested it with mythic importance that was more emotional
than analytic (e.g., “all Americans are descended from immigrants”). Nev-
ertheless, I have no doubt that many of the statements we heard were true.
There was a sizeable group of people who were just on the margin of at-
tending or not attending college and for whom college was transforming.
We probably all know at least a few people for whom college opened “a
new heaven and a new earth,” yet who might easily not have gone to col-
lege at all, had circumstances been a little diﬀerent.
If there is one theme of this book, it is that this group of people no longer
exists. Put more bluntly, it is not about attending college anymore. The
simple margin of whether to attend is not where the action is. This is not to
say that college is not transforming: It is, for some people, but they are ap-
parently people whose attendance decision is not easily swayed by circum-
stances. This is not to say that college decisions are not important: They
are, but the important decisions are more complicated. The action is not in
whether a student attends, but which college he attends (in-state or out-of-
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nomic Research.state, two-year or four-year, more or less selective) and how he attends
(continuously or sporadically, full-time or part-time, immediately after
high school graduation or delayed). Simply put, it is not college attendance
that is interesting, but college choices—thus the book’s title.
Often, writers of introductions to multiauthor volumes dread the task of
ﬁnding a common theme among the chapters while also doing justice to
their diversity and richness. I am fortunate. My theme (it is not just about
attending college anymore) simply fell out of the chapters that follow, dis-
tinct as they are. We did not begin writing this book with the plan of
demonstrating that the attendance margin was no longer interesting. We
began with two ideas. First, we wanted to illustrate what researchers could
do with the best methods and latest available data on colleges. Recent years
have witnessed great improvements on both fronts, and the advent of mas-
sive data sets based on students’ records has allowed us to use exemplary
empirical techniques. Second, we wanted to explore the newest, most un-
derinvestigated topics in higher education. Some were underinvestigated
because they dealt with very recent policies: education savings accounts,
higher education tax credits, and state merit scholarships. Other topics
were underinvestigated because they dealt with problems that, while not
new, have only recently risen to prominence: the lack of persistence among
college students and the role of out-of-state students at public universities.
Still other topics were underinvestigated because data have been unavail-
able until the authors of this book gathered it for themselves: whether high
merit students are swayed by the scholarships oﬀered them, whether col-
lege mentoring programs work, whether the Pell Grant helps prevent stu-
dents from dropping out of college, and whether one’s college peers matter.
This book has its roots in a conference where we authors (and many
other researchers) listened instead of spoke. We heard from chief practi-
tioners of higher education: deans and provosts, college advisors, college
admissions chiefs, designers of ﬁnancial aid, and leaders of advocacy
groups. They told us which new policies needed analysis, which old ques-
tions needed new answers, and which were the up-and-coming trends.
None of the participants at that conference suggested that the atten-
dance margin had given place to other college choices. On the contrary, the
practitioners mainly advised us to analyze policies that they (and we) be-
lieved had substantial eﬀects on attendance. Conference participants
would typically phrase their questions in terms of attendance—for in-
stance, “How do states’ merit scholarship programs aﬀect attendance?”
Even at the very recent conference where we presented these chapters, par-
ticipants hesitated to announce that the attendance margin was passé, de-
spite the evidence piling up around them. Yet, rereading these chapters, the
conclusion is unescapable. Again and again, we learn that a new or impor-
tant policy has little eﬀect on attendance but does signiﬁcantly aﬀect stu-
dents’ other college choices.
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margin is passé? What it means is that opportunities to attend college have
suﬃciently expanded so that almost every young person who is eligible and
likely to beneﬁt from college does try it at some point, in some form. The
vast majority of seventeen-year-olds in the United States claim that they
plan to attend college, and the vast majority do. How and when they attend
are another matter. Put another way, college education has an extensive
margin and an intensive margin. It appears that the extensive margin is
now exhausted, while the intensive margin remains active.
A skeptic might say that we have always known that the intensive mar-
gin was important and that I am belaboring the point. While I could see
where the skeptic was coming from, I would have to disagree. On the one
hand, many families do believe that intensive-margin decisions, like where
and how to attend college, are important. Indeed, the fact that policies
aﬀect these decisions demonstrates that families are thinking about them.
On the other hand, families have very little evidence on which to base their
intensive-margin decisions, such as “Does it matter whether I attend col-
lege right away?” and “Does it matter whether I begin at a two- or four-year
college?” and so on. Families are also not being helped by policymakers,
many of whom talk exclusively about “access,” attendance, and “making
the thirteenth year of education universal.” News ﬂash to policymakers:
The vast majority of Americans are getting through the access door, so
your policies are mainly aﬀecting what they do once inside it. Mind you,
policymakers may be more much more alert to the intensive margin than
they let on: It is diplomatic and democratic to ignore the distinctions
among colleges and diﬀerent patterns of college attendance. Nevertheless,
the evidence in this book suggests that we need to learn how to assess poli-
cies on the basis of their eﬀects on college choice, timing of attendance, and
so on.
Contributors and Contributions
The fact that I can make such pronouncements with conﬁdence is owing
to the authors of this book, whose work is up to date in every way. They not
only analyze the newest policies and questions but use the latest, best
methods. Every chapter illustrates high-quality analysis. In econometric
terms, the results are all well identiﬁed. The data are so up-to-date that sev-
eral authors took “just-on-time” data delivery and wrote chapters that they
could not have written a few months before.
Lest the authors get all the credit for their good methods and contem-
poraneity, let me gratefully acknowledge the vital work of the discussants
and the higher education practitioners who spoke at the seminal confer-
ence. Our discussants played two key roles. First, they scoured papers for
weaknesses in methods, data, and exposition. Their constructive criticism
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of research. Second, the discussants put the research in context, reminding
us how the results ﬁt into the larger questions troubling the higher educa-
tion community. In the comments published in this volume, the reader will
mainly see the discussants in their second role because their detailed criti-
cisms were largely absorbed by the authors. We are very grateful to our dis-
cussants: Charles Clotfelter, Thomas S. Dee, Jonathan Guryan, Michael
McPherson, Harvey S. Rosen, Michael Rothschild, Bruce Sacerdote, Chris-
topher Taber, and Michelle J. White. We are also grateful to Derek Neal
and Doug Staiger, whose conference comments were important to several
authors.
The higher education practitioners who gave us a window on the latest
concerns in higher education deserve much of the credit for the up-to-
dateness of the book. They are too many to list, but we want especially to
acknowledge Gary Barnes (University of North Carolina), Pat Callan
(National Center for Higher Education Policy), Timothy Lane (Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association–College Retirement Equity Fund
[TIAA-CREF], Dan Madzelan (U.S. Department of Education, Oﬃce of
Postsecondary Education), Gretchen Rigol (The College Board), and Rae
Lee Saporin (University of California, Los Angeles [UCLA]).
College Choices: What We Learned
Sarah Turner sets up the book by showing the big picture on college-
going over the last thirty years. She starts with the observation that policy-
makers tend to focus exclusively on getting students to start college, ne-
glecting the question of whether they complete college. She demonstrates
that this emphasis is misplaced because, although the rate of college atten-
dance has risen signiﬁcantly, the rate of college completion has been fall-
ing. Thus, despite their much higher attendance, today’s high school gradu-
ates are only slightly more likely to complete college by age twenty-three
than their 1970 counterparts. Also, many of today’s students who eventu-
ally complete college progress through college very slowly, with sporadic
course-taking and transfers among colleges. All this has occurred during
two decades of steady increases in the return to college completion, which
suggests that the employers need more college graduates. Employers ap-
parently want prompt completers too: Students who complete college in a
sporadic fashion have much lower earnings than those who complete it by
age twenty-three.
Having demonstrated that a lack of demand for on-time college gradu-
ates is surely not the explanation for falling college completion, Turner in-
vestigates other explanations. Because of the large number of possible ex-
planations, Turner does not attempt a deﬁnitive study of each. However,
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demographics do not account for falling completion. She ﬁnds empirical
evidence for several explanations, which are not mutually exclusive. For in-
stance, some of the decrease in completion is due to the marginal college
enrollee having lower aptitude than his earlier counterpart. Some of the de-
crease is due to federal ﬁnancial aid having been increasingly focused on
marginal enrollees. Additional decreases are due to states having increas-
ingly focused their resources on their inexpensive two-year colleges as op-
posed to their four-year colleges. Turner leaves us with a question that is
still largely open.
Conference participants were willing to propose a variety of other actors
for blame. Some suggested that secondary schools were at fault because
they had allowed the quality of college preparation to decline (even if the ap-
titude of the marginal attendee has declined only slightly). Others suggested
that colleges were to blame because they increasingly facilitate sporadic at-
tendance patterns by allowing students to pay on a per-course (as opposed
to a per-semester) basis, liberally granting transfer credits, and not penaliz-
ing students for lack of timely progress. Still other participants focused on
students’ lack of realism about the skills and eﬀort required by college.
Susan Dynarski explores state merit aid programs, which have swept
through state legislatures, fast becoming state governments’ most impor-
tant form of support for higher education. Although the Georgia Helping
Outstanding Pupils Educationally (HOPE) Scholarship is the best known
state merit scholarship, similar programs now exist in most Southern
states, some Southwestern states, and a smattering of other states, includ-
ing Michigan. The typical program grants scholarships to all students with
a certain grade point average (such as a B) and/or a certain score on college
admission tests. The scholarships are good only at in-state colleges and are
frequently generous enough to cover tuition at the state’s public colleges.
Dynarski’s ﬁrst question is whether state merit scholarships raise college
attendance. Carefully exploiting changes in the timing of the programs to
identify their eﬀects, she demonstrates that the typical merit aid program
raised the enrollment rate by only 1.4 percentage points, an amount that is
not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This lack of an eﬀect sug-
gests that the vast majority of students who get merit scholarships would
have attended college anyway. She goes on to show, however, that merit
scholarships do alter students’ matriculation decisions. For instance, the
scholarships induce students to “upgrade” from two-year colleges to four-
year colleges.
Dynarski examines the distributional consequences of the merit aid pro-
grams, demonstrating that the typical program is somewhat regressive
(they primarily beneﬁt middle- and upper-income families but are paid for
by taxes and lotteries that aﬀect lower-income families) and that Georgia’s
Introduction 5Hope Scholarship is dramatically regressive because students cannot si-
multaneously take it and a Pell Grant (a federal grant for poor students).
Dynarski and conference participants enjoyed animated speculation
about the political popularity of merit aid programs, especially in South-
ern states, which are eager to catch up to and surpass the traditional edu-
cation-oriented states of the Northeast and Midwest. All states can see that
jobs are gravitating towards concentrations of well-educated workers, and
the South is perhaps using merit aid as a way to eﬃciently focus its educa-
tional resources on students who are likely to succeed. Conference partic-
ipants also wondered what will happen when all states have merit programs
and realize that the game of keeping the “best and brightest” at home is a
zero-sum game (or worse, because it implies inﬂexible, and thus ineﬃcient,
allocation of resources).
Bridget Long shows us that the Hope Credit and the Lifetime Learning
Tax Credit (LLTC), enacted in 1998, will almost certainly become by far
the largest federal programs for higher education. When everyone eligible
for the credits discovers them and takes them up, the federal government
will spend more on the credits than it does on the next two largest higher
education programs combined. This is both because the credits are reason-
ably generous ($1,500 to $2,000) and because eligibility for the credits is
very broad (a person who merely takes a recreational college course can be
eligible). Long ﬁnds that the tax credits suﬀer from the slow information
dispersal that plagues other aid programs: Take up of the credits was far
below projections during their ﬁrst three years, but participation is climb-
ing at double-digit rates.
Long’s ﬁrst question is whether the credits increased postsecondary en-
rollment among eligible students. She ﬁnds that they did not. She then in-
vestigates whether the credits altered students’ college choices: They did,
causing students to “upgrade” to colleges with greater resources and higher
tuition.
William Bennett is usually credited with the hypothesis that colleges at-
tempt to “capture” ﬁnancial aid and scholarships by raising tuition when
government grants and loans become more generous.1 Long points out
that the tax credits have distinctive features that make them less likely to be
captured than other government aid. Families receive the tax credits sev-
eral months after paying college tuition, and the recipient of the credit is
typically the parent, not the student. Nevertheless, Long carefully works
out which colleges are most likely to engage in capture behavior. These turn
out to be public colleges because they can coordinate tuition increases,
which would be risky if undertaken unilaterally in the competitive college
market. Long then shows that some states did raise their public colleges’
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1. The Bennett hypothesis remains a popular idea, despite a lack of evidence to support it.tuition in order to capture the federal credits, especially the tuition of col-
leges with many eligible students.
Conference participants debated whether the tax code is a good vehicle
for federal aid to higher education. What seems undebatable is that it is an
increasingly important vehicle.
This point is underscored by Jennifer Ma’s study of the newly enacted
education savings accounts, which encourage families to save for college
expenses by allowing their savings contributions to accumulate tax free. In
fact, education savings accounts are very similar to the familiar Roth Indi-
vidual Retirement Account (IRA) except that the savings are to be spent
on college, not retirement. The federal education savings accounts (Cover-
dell Accounts) allow families to save up to $2,000 per child per year. The
state-sponsored education savings accounts (529 Plans) have no annual
limit on savings and have high overall savings limits as well. Some 529
Plans even make contributions tax deductible. In short, education savings
accounts should be extremely attractive savings vehicles for many families
who face future college costs.
Some commentators worry that families will not save more when oﬀered
the chance to use education savings accounts: Perhaps they will merely
move existing savings from regular accounts to education savings ac-
counts. Such behavior would defeat the purpose of the accounts. Readers
familiar with the literature on retirement will recognize that the same con-
cern haunts IRAs and 401(k)s. Using new data that appear to be the only
data that can address this concern, Ma shows us the ﬁrst empirical evi-
dence on the savings eﬀect of the education savings accounts. To control
for families’ preexisting propensity to save, she employs several alternative
techniques, including recently developed propensity score methods. Part
of her study focuses particularly on families who already have IRA ac-
counts. Since they are habitual savers already familiar with tax-advantaged
savings accounts, they are perhaps the most likely to move existing savings
into education savings accounts. Ma does not ﬁnd evidence that education
savings incentives reduce other household savings; Education savings ac-
counts apparently do raise savings.
Conference participants thought that education savings accounts will
eventually be an important prong of government support for higher edu-
cation. If parents start saving when their child is small, not only will they
enjoy substantial beneﬁts, but their child will also know that he should pre-
pare for college during his key years of secondary school. Observers have
long speculated that teenagers who are unsure about whether their families
are prepared to support them in college are teenagers who do not prepare
well for college.
Poor students in the United States are eligible for the Pell Grant, which
is intended to help them pay for college education without undue ﬁnancial
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Yet most previous studies of the Pell Grant suggest that it has no eﬀect on
college completion. Some studies have even claimed to ﬁnd that the Pell
Grant reduces college completion, leading observers to speculate that the
Pell Grant might induce students to enroll in college frivolously so that
they soon drop out. Eric Bettinger starts with this puzzle and demonstrates
that previous studies do not account suﬃciently for the fact that Pell Grant
recipients are more likely to drop out of college ex ante.
Using unparalleled administrative data on every student in Ohio who ap-
plies for ﬁnancial aid, Bettinger provides convincing estimates of how Pell
Grants aﬀect a student’s probability of staying in college. Because he has
complete administrative data, he is able to identify those students for whom
the Pell Grant changed exogenously between their freshman and sopho-
more years (this occurs largely because a students’ family composition
changes through a sibling being born or leaving home). He ﬁnds that stu-
dents whose Pell Grant rose were slightly more likely to stay in college; stu-
dents whose Pell Grant fell were slightly less likely to stay in college. That
is, the Pell Grant does appear to work as designed: It helps students stay in
college. Bettinger concludes by noting that even if the Pell Grant does not
have a dramatic positive eﬀect on college completion, it is surely important
to know that previous studies were wrong when they concluded that the Pell
Grant induced students to drop out.
Conference participants were excited by the possibilities of data like Bet-
tinger’s, which allowed him to use empirical techniques that demand a
great deal of data: simulated instrumental variables and regression discon-
tinuity. Readers may enjoy Bettinger’s chapter as much for the display of
methods and data as for the results.
Hoxby and Avery investigate how students respond to the packages of
ﬁnancial aid and scholarships they are oﬀered. They focus on high-
aptitude students because such students are oﬀered the most complex and
attractive packages of aid. Interestingly enough, Hoxby and Avery had to
create a survey and gather data from more than 3,200 students to research
this question. This is because even very large surveys, such as the U.S. De-
partment of Education’s surveys of over 50,000 students, contain tiny num-
bers of high-aptitude students and are not oriented toward gathering the
details of the complicated scholarship packages they are oﬀered.
Using econometric methods especially suited to studying college choice
(conditional logit), Hoxby and Avery identify how each student responds
to his menu of college options, each with its own ﬁnancial package and col-
lege characteristics. Their ﬁrst question is whether college students seem
broadly rational when making college choices. The answer is yes: The typ-
ical high-aptitude student is sensitive to college characteristics like tuition
(lower tuition is more attractive) and the aptitude of fellow students
(higher peer aptitude is more attractive). Although students from diﬀerent
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ences are not dramatic; most college choice behavior is shared by the en-
tire array of high-aptitude students.
Hoxby and Avery go on to ask how students respond to the various com-
ponents of their ﬁnancial aid packages. They ﬁnd that about two-thirds of
students do alter their college choices in response to more generous grants,
loans, and work-study. The remaining third appear to be indiﬀerent to aid
packages, largely because they are well oﬀ enough to be swayed by other
college characteristics, such as the peer group and resources it oﬀers.
Among the two-thirds of high-aptitude students whose decisions can be
swayed by aid packages, about half respond to aid like “rational” investors
in their own human capital, and half do not. The rational investors accept
only aid oﬀers that are more than generous enough to oﬀset the reductions
in college resources that are associated with the aid. The remaining stu-
dents do not look like rational investors because they are excessively at-
tracted by loans and work-study—for instance, they like a dollar of loans
as much as a dollar of grants. They also are attracted by superﬁcial aspects
of a grant, like its being called a “scholarship” and its being front-loaded.
They care more about the share of comprehensive costs that a grant covers
than the actual amount of the grant.
Hoxby and Avery speculate about what explains the irrational students:
naïveté or a simple lack of cash. Open-ended responses to their survey sug-
gest that naïveté may be the more important explanation. Conference par-
ticipants were divided in interpreting the results. Some thought the glass
was half full: Most students seem to understand ﬁnancial aid oﬀers and act
accordingly. Some thought the glass was half empty because aid packages
seemed to confuse a substantial minority of students—and high-aptitude
students at that.
Rizzo and Ehrenberg begin by observing that diﬀerent state universities
pursue very diﬀerent strategies with respect to nonresident enrollment and
in-state and out-of-state tuition levels. Some state ﬂagship universities
charge high out-of-state tuition and allow nonresidents to make up a sig-
niﬁcant minority of their students. They may do this in order to raise rev-
enue, but they may also be using nonresident students to raise peer quality.
Other state ﬂagship universities pursue entirely diﬀerent policies. Some
sharply limit the number of out-of-state students. Some charge out-of-state
tuition that is similar to in-state tuition. Some even sign tuition reciprocity
agreements so that out-of-state students pay in-state tuition. What ex-
plains these diverse strategies? Rizzo and Ehrenberg explore explanations
based on politics, demographics, income, history, university governance,
and the local availability of private colleges.
The challenge Rizzo and Ehrenberg face is that colleges make a lot of
decisions simultaneously. For instance, they do not choose their in-state
tuition and student body ﬁrst and only then turn to setting out-of-state tu-
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cies into account when setting their in-state policies and vice versa. Thus
Rizzo and Ehrenberg must jointly estimate a college’s choice of in-state
tuition, out-of-state tuition, in-state admissions, out-of-state admissions,
and tuition reciprocity agreements. This is a diﬃcult problem, and the au-
thors meet it by using a long panel of data. This allows them to see how col-
leges change their policies in response to changing circumstances. They
also conducted their own survey of tuition reciprocity agreements.
Rizzo and Ehrenberg ﬁnd that most public ﬂagship universities seem not
to use nonresident enrollment primarily as a revenue-generating strategy.
Instead, the institutions appear to enroll nonresident students in an eﬀort
to raise their peer quality. The authors also ﬁnd that state universities en-
roll nonresidents in order to achieve economies of scale in programs that
would be too small for cost eﬃciency with in-state students only. Rizzo and
Ehrenberg show population pressure probably explains why certain states
strictly limit out-of-state students who could be a potential source of rev-
enue. California, for instance, ﬁnds it hard to build colleges fast enough to
cope with its growing student population. Conversely, states like Vermont
have no population pressure and welcome out-of-state students. Confer-
ence participants were intrigued by the political and historical factors that
make otherwise similar states, like Ohio and Michigan, pursue diﬀerent
strategies.
Avery and Kane are motivated by two puzzles that emerge from previous
studies. First, students react much more to changes in tuition than they do
to equivalent changes in aid or in the wage gain associated with college.
This suggests that students pay more attention to tuition, which is easy to
observe, than to costs and beneﬁts of college that are more diﬃcult to de-
cipher. Second, survey data have long shown that students from low-
income and minority families display a sort of cognitive dissonance about
their likelihood of attending and completing college. Even when they are
not taking the steps necessary to get into college, many say that they expect
to get baccalaureate degrees.
In a major eﬀort that combined surveying and mentoring, Avery and
Kane collected data from three inner-city Boston high schools and a public
high school in a middle to upper-income Boston suburb. The suburban stu-
dents were simply surveyed, but inner-city students who expressed an in-
terest in college were assigned to mentors who guided them through the
college application process. The mentors were Harvard undergraduates,
who are about as skilled in the application process as anyone could be. In
fact, between their own recent experience and their training, the mentors
were probably signiﬁcantly better informed about applying to college than
were the parents of the suburban students.
Avery and Kane ﬁrst asked whether the suburban students started with
better information about the costs and beneﬁts of college. If they did, it
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inner-city students were not. This ﬁrst result surprised Avery and Kane:
The suburban and inner-city students had very similar information about
the costs and beneﬁts of going to college. The two groups had strikingly
similar estimates of college tuition and the wage gain associated with col-
lege. In short, the evidence suggested that a simple information gap was not
the problem and that the mentors would need to do more than relay infor-
mation if they were to alter the behavior of inner-city students.
Avery and Kane then investigated whether mentoring, which included
help with scheduling college admission exams and completing applica-
tions, raises an inner-city student’s probability of enrolling in college. They
ﬁnd that it does.
Even so, a substantial minority of the inner-city students continued to
exhibit a sort of cognitive dissonance. Even when mentored, they simulta-
neously failed to take adequate steps to get into college and still expressed
a high degree of conﬁdence about getting a baccalaureate degree.
Conference participants were wondered about longer term outcomes
among the inner-city students who received mentoring. Will the mentoring
simply have boosted their probability of attending? Will they quickly drop
out or, instead, be more likely to attain their goal of a baccalaureate de-
gree? These are questions that Avery and Kane must answer later; they
were some of the authors who took just-on-time delivery of their data.
Finally, Winston and Zimmerman study peer eﬀects in college. I have
consciously kept back their study for the end of the book (and the end of
this summary) because peers are a theme of almost sublime importance in
the economics of college education. Until one has studied the choices of
students and college, it is hard to appreciate why it matters so much
whether peer eﬀects exist and what they are like. If the reader looks back
over the chapters already described, however, he will see that peers bob up
again and again. They help explain why students upgrade when given tax
credits, why states create merit scholarships to encourage students to stay
in-state, why high-aptitude students receive the array of aid they do, and
why public universities enroll nonresident students. Most studies of college
education implicitly assume that peer eﬀects exist, not because the re-
searchers believe in peers per se, but because the researchers just cannot
make sense of what they see unless they attribute some role to peers. This
is Winston and Zimmerman’s ﬁrst point: They explain, in an admirably
clear way, why it is so important that we learn about peer eﬀects. They also
explain why peer eﬀects need to be nonlinear. I will leave the details to
them, but I will brieﬂy state that the colleges we see do not make sense un-
less some arrangements of peers produce more learning than others. If re-
arranging peers did not make any diﬀerence on net (one student’s loss of a
good peer was exactly oﬀset by another student’s gain of that peer), then
the peer arrangements that we see would not arise.
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peer eﬀects in college. They use a “natural experiment” that takes place at
all colleges that randomly assign freshmen roommates. A randomly as-
signed roommate is a randomly assigned peer. If a high-achieving peer is
good for a student’s own achievement, then being assigned a roommate
with higher incoming achievement should raise his achievement. Observe
that the natural experiment avoids a fundamental problem that can plague
studies of peer eﬀects: Most peers are not assigned randomly. A person’s
own choices aﬀect who ends up being his friends and fellow students. Thus,
it is normally hard to tell whether two high-achieving students are friends
because their similarity drew them together or because they were friends
ﬁrst and then inﬂuenced one another.
Winston and Zimmerman show us the results from three such natural
experiments (three diﬀerent colleges). They also carefully survey the evi-
dence from similar natural experiments in a few other colleges. They con-
clude that peer eﬀects do exist, in the expected direction: a higher achiev-
ing peer is better for a student’s own achievement. They also ﬁnd some
evidence that peer eﬀects are nonlinear. Roughly speaking, middle-
achieving students are sensitive to low-achieving peers, but high-achieving
students are not. Also, high-achieving students are especially sensitive to
one another.
The conference participants emphasized that evidence like Winston and
Zimmerman’s is just the tip of the iceberg. This is because roommates at a
selective college vary only so much and because a student’s roommate is
only one of many peers with whom he interacts. If we could observe the full
range of possible peer matchups, we might ﬁnd much larger peer eﬀects.
Next on the Agenda for the Economics of College Education
Reviewing these chapters makes me eagerly anticipate the next decade of
economic research on college education. I cannot regret the passing of the
era in which all research was expected to end in the question, “Did atten-
dance increase?” While we will not neglect attendance, we will expect to
look at a richer set of questions: which college to attend, when to attend it,
and how to pay for it. Our data will undoubtedly continue to improve, and
we should be able to provide evidence that allows both families and policy-
makers to make their college choices better.
12 Caroline M. Hoxby